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Board reputation attributes and corporate social performance:  







The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between board reputation and corporate social 
performance. Specifically, we claim that corporate social performance may be a function of board 
attributes and we investigate the association between board reputation – in terms of board 
composition, competence, diversity, leadership, structure and links with the external environment – 
and the social performance of firms, after controlling for other company-specific characteristics.  
In order to explore such a relationship, we analyse the association between corporate social 
performance and board reputation of the Business Ethics 100 Best Corporate Citizens over the 
period 2005-2007. Data on corporate social responsibility are collected from the KLD‟s 
SOCRATES database, which is derived from multiple sources and is not dependent upon corporate 
self-reporting. Data on board reputation are hand-collected from corporate reports and proxy 
statements.  
Our empirical evidence shows that the proportions of independent, community influential and 
female directors are positively associated with corporate social performance, while the presence of a 
CSR committee is positively associated with community performance. In contrast, we find that 
CEO duality and community influential directors with multiple directorships have a negative effect 
on corporate social performance. 
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Board reputation attributes and corporate social performance:  




The recent financial crisis, the collapse of high profile companies and the increasingly stringent 
stakeholders pressure have increased debate on corporate governance and board responsibility. 
More emphasis is being placed on the ethical, environmental and social responsibilities of the firm 
towards a broad range of stakeholders in order to establish and enhance the firm‟s legitimacy to 
operate. According to Neu et al. (1998: 265), organisational legitimacy improves the inflow of 
resources necessary for the viability of the company (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Neu et al., 1998), 
allows for the avoidance of product boycotts and other disruptive actions (Elsbach, 1994) and 
enhances corporate reputation (de Quevedo-Puente et al., 2007).  
The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between board reputation and corporate social 
performance amongst the Best US Corporate Citizens. Specifically, we claim that corporate social 
performance may be a function of board reputation and we classify group the concept of board 
reputation into several attributes: board composition, competence, diversity, leadership, structure 
and links with the external environment. We investigate the effects that each of these attributes has 
on the social performance of firms, after controlling for other company-specific characteristics.  
In order to explore such a relationship, we make use of a US-based sample of companies considered 
the Best Corporate Citizens over the period 2005-2007. We analyse the association between 
corporate social performance and board reputation of the Business Ethics 100 Best Corporate 
Citizens. This dataset has the advantage of providing us with a multidimensional measure of each 
firm‟s social performance. Data on corporate social responsibility are collected from the KLD‟s 
SOCRATES database, which is derived from multiple sources and is not dependent upon corporate 
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self-reporting. Data on board reputation are hand-collected from corporate reports and proxy 
statements. We employ various measures to proxy for board reputation: the proportion of 
independent directors, the proportion of community influential directors, the proportion of women, 
CEO duality, the presence of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee and relational 
capital (multiple directorates). 
We find that board reputation is positively associated with the social performance of the 100 Best 
Corporate Citizens. Our empirical evidence shows that (i) the proportion of independent directors is 
positively associated with corporate social performance and environmental performance; (ii) the 
proportion of community influential directors is positively associated with corporate social 
performance, community performance and environmental performance; (iii) the proportion of 
women directors is positively related also with employee relations and human rights performance; 
(iv) the presence of a CSR committee is positively associated with community performance and 
human rights performance. Moreover, we provide empirical support for the hypothesis that CEO 
duality is detrimental to corporate social performance, as indeed are directors with multiple 
directorships. 
This paper makes several contributions. First of all, it explores the relationship between board 
reputation attributes and corporate social performance, which to the best of our knowledge has not 
been studied yet in the literature. Second, we provide theoretical and empirical evidence that the 
effect of board attributes on corporate social performance is depicted more completely when 
looking at the specific competences of directors, as in the case of community influential directors. 
Thus traditional proxies for board composition are not a good prediction of the service role of the 
board in terms of legitimacy and reputation. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework. The 
development of hypotheses is presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the research methodology, 




2. Theoretical framework 
The main question we try to answer in this paper is which characteristics and attributes of the board 
of directors are related to the corporate social performance of companies. In order to discuss the 
role of the board of directors with regard to corporate social performance, we will refer to resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), while we will rely on legitimacy theory to discuss 
the theoretical underpinnings of such a relationship (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
The board of directors is the „apex of the decision-making process‟ (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002: 
400) and they are ultimately responsible for corporate social strategy, whether this strategy is 
„proactively pursued or passively rubber-stamped‟ (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002: 400). According to 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003), the board of directors plays two different functions: monitoring 
(control role) and provision of resources (service role). The monitoring function has been mainly 
analysed following agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), according 
to which directors are responsible for monitoring managers on behalf of shareholders, given the 
potential for conflicts of interest arising with the separation of ownership and control (Berle and 
Means, 1932). On the other hand, the focus on the service role of boards is the perspective adopted 
in the resource dependence (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2000) and 
stakeholders‟ research (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001; Huse, 2003). 
Indeed, various authors advocate a broadening of the corporate governance agenda to encompass a 
stakeholder and legitimacy perspective (Tirole, 2001; Huse, 2003; OECD, 2004; Webb, 2004; 
Aguilera et al., 2006; Deakin and Whittaker, 2007; Brennan and Solomon, 2008). Following this 
perspective, the board of directors can be seen a mechanism of legitimacy and reputation, as its role 
is to ensure that the company is managed efficiently, top management has oversight and 
stakeholders‟ interests are taken into consideration at the highest levels of decision making 
(Michelon and Parbonetti, 2010).  
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According to resource dependence theory, boards consist of both human capital (experience, 
expertise and reputation) and relational capital (network of ties to other firms and external 
contingencies) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003: 383), thus assuring the management of external 
dependencies and the provision of important external resources (Hillman et al., 2001). Directors are 
seen not only as keepers of shareholders‟ fiduciary duties, but also as able to enhance the firm‟s 
reputation, by establishing contacts with the external environment and providing top management 
with insightful advice as to what stakeholders expect from the company. Markarian and Parbonetti 
(2007: 1225) in examining board of director composition, assert that boards perform different tasks 
at the same time and that, within the board, each director plays a specific role consistent with her 
own skills, competencies, professional expertise and links with the external environment that 
produces „a mosaic of decision making structures and subsequent firm behaviour‟. 
Following Zahra and Pearce, (1989: 297), in this paper we assume that corporate boards act as 
„boundary spanners‟ and perform many roles at the same time, providing four types of benefits to 
the firm: advice and counselling (Mintzberg, 1983; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989); legitimacy 
(Selznick, 1949); channels for communicating information between external organisations and the 
company (Hillman et al., 1999) and preferential access to commitments or support from important 
stakeholders in the company‟s environment (Hillman et al., 2001). Thus, directors may do more 
than reduce uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2000), as they bring resources and legitimacy to the 
company (Gales and Kesener, 1994). Within this framework, the reputation of the directors in the 
community and among stakeholders enables the company to carry on its business and actions, 
mobilise external support and resources, and enhance organisational legitimacy (Provan, 1980; 
Deephouse, 2000). 
Organisational legitimacy has been discussed for some time in the academic literature. Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975: 122) suggest „organisations seek to establish congruence between the societal values 
associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger 
social system of which they are a part. Insofar as these two value systems are congruent we can 
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speak of organisational legitimacy‟. Corporate social responsibility has been addressed in the 
literature (e.g. Husted and Allen, 2000) as a strategy that helps companies in addressing societal 
concerns about corporate behaviour and thus is able to enhance organisational legitimacy. 
According to de Quevedo-Puente et al. (2007: 66) corporate social performance describes „the 
degree of legitimacy of the firm‟s behaviour by the standard of its institutional context‟, so that a 
firm is behaving legitimately when its actions are perceived as congruent with society‟s 
expectations (Suchman, 1995) on the social, environmental and economic impact of the firm‟s 
activities. According to Unerman and Bennett (2004: 685), „good corporate governance and 
accountability should focus on addressing these social, environmental, economic and ethical 
expectations‟.   
As firms operate in a constantly changing environment, they must show that they operate within the 
bounds, values and norms of the society (Brown and Deegan, 1998). By legitimacy, i.e. the 
accumulation of similar social performances over time (de Quevedo-Puente et al., 2007), the firm is 
able to consolidate its corporate reputation (Fombrun and Rindova, 1994; Rao, 1994). 
Corporate social performance has been widely discussed in the literature (see, e.g. Carroll, 1979 and 
1991; Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Clarkson, 1995), as being a multidimensional concept (Johnson 
and Greening, 1999), associated with corporate legitimacy (de Quevedo-Puente et al., 2007) and 
built on a set of principles, processes and policies (Wood, 1991).  
The effects of boards‟ characteristics on social performance, defined as the outcome of the firm‟s 
social strategy (Husted and Allen, 2000), will be studied with reference to the various roles played 
by the board and the directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), considering that, by establishing external 
ties with stakeholders and the wider society, directors are able to attract and retain precious 
resources to the firm‟s survival and thus enhance the organisational legitimacy (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989: 297).  
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Based on the above considerations and given the lack of significant board variables in social 
performance studies, our objective is to investigate whether board reputation has an effect on 
corporate social performance. 
 
 
3. Development of hypotheses 
Based on the idea that corporate governance encompasses all „the interests that affect the viability, 
competence and moral character of an enterprise‟ (Selznick, 1992: 290; Worthy and Neuschel, 
1983; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) and that board reputation consists of both human capital, in terms 
of experience, expertise, leadership, and of relational capital, in terms of ties with external 
contingencies (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), we analyse the impact of board composition, 
competence, diversity, leadership, structure and links with the external environment on corporate 
social performance. 
Board composition – Independent directors 
According to the resource dependence framework (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), independent 
directors attract valuable resources vital to the companies‟ viability by establishing external links 
with stakeholders and other organisations and they enhance the reputation of the firm (Certo et al., 
2001). The presence of independent directors on the board should increase the board‟s objectivity 
and its ability to represent multiple points of view of the firm‟s role in the environment and among 
stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Moreover, according to Johnson and Greening (1999: 
569), by representing various constituents and being knowledgeable about the critical contingencies 
facing firms, they „may be more inclined to comply with environmental standards to avoid 
penalties, fines and negative media exposure and a subsequent loss of reputation‟. In this sense, they 
„reflect changing societal values in shaping corporate identity because boards lack requisite power 
to bring about desired changes in the role of the corporation‟ (Zahra and Pearce, 1989: 304).  
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Wang and Dewhirst (1992) find that outside directors are likely to have a stakeholder orientation 
and are conscious of the expectations of the different constituencies of the firm. Johnson and 
Greening (1999) find empirical support for their hypothesis that outside directors‟ representation is 
positively associated with corporate social performance. The theoretical argument behind these 
findings is that, by being more dedicated to stakeholders‟ expectations, independent directors will 
increase their own prestige and role in society and thus they will be more likely to encourage the 
company to undertake CSR activities. 
If independent directors are likely to respect the stakeholder obligations of the firm, they are more 
likely to be committed to stakeholder responsibility because in this way they increase their prestige 
and role in society (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Hence, we present our first 
research hypothesis, in alternative form: 




Board competence – community influential directors 
Previous research on corporate governance and social performance has mainly concentrated on the 
role played by outside (independent) directors (see, e.g. Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
Following Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Markarian and Parbonetti (2007), non-executive 
directors are not homogeneous in terms of skills, competencies, expertise and networks with the 
external environment. We argue that the specific and unique individual competencies of board 
directors contribute differently to the board process and priorities, thus motivating management to 
adopt specific strategies and actions (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991). In order to understand the 
impact that diversity in terms of competencies and backgrounds of directors has on social 
performance, we concentrate on community influential directors (Hillman et al., 2000; Michelon 
and Parbonetti, 2010). 
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Community influential directors (hereafter „community influentials‟) typically are „directors with 
experience and linkages relevant to the firm‟s environment beyond competitor firms and suppliers. 
Community influentials include directors who possess knowledge about or influence over important 
non-business organisations‟ (Hillman et al., 2000: 241)1. They are mainly political and religious 
leaders, university faculty, and members of social or community organisations, including military 
officers (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986; Hillman et al., 2000). By supplying the firm with linkages 
to society beyond the competitive context, they bring experience and connection to community 
groups and organisations (Baron, 1995), like societal movements and non-profit organisations. 
According to Hillman et al. (2000: 242), community influentials „provide valuable non-business 
perspectives on proposed actions and strategies‟. In this sense, their competence, expertise and 
influence on societal constituencies help the firm in avoiding strategic choices and actions against 
the interests of such constituencies and promoting socially responsible actions. 
The presence of community influentials on the board helps in obtaining commitments or support 
from important stakeholders and, by establishing these relationships with stakeholder groups, they 
provide legitimacy to the company. According to Kassinis and Vafeas (2002: 401), community 
influentials are „less likely to tolerate environmental irresponsibility because their interests are more 
closely aligned with the interests of the community at large‟. Since they provide the board with 
better knowledge about stakeholders‟ needs and expectations, they enhance the board awareness 
about stakeholders‟ expectations and ensure that their interests are taken into account during 
corporate decision making (Selznick, 1992). As a consequence, they might promote corporate social 
performance in order to ensure congruence between the firm‟s decisions and societal values. This 
leads us to the formulation of the second hypothesis, in alternative form: 
                                                 
1
 Let us assume that a company operating in the mining industry appoints a World Wildlife Fund (WWF) representative 
to its board. This appointment is to signal to the wider society that the company wants to be committed to the 
environment and thus society will expect this company to be more environmentally responsible given the presence of 
that particular community influential. 
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H2:  Corporate social performance is positively associated with the proportion of community 
influentials. 
Board diversity – women on the board 
According to Coffey and Wang (1998), board diversity is defined as variation among its members
2
. 
The relevance of female presence on the board is stressed by Hillman et al. (2002) and more 
recently by Adams and Ferreira (2009), according to whom they are increasingly being appointed to 
corporate boards. According to the literature on gender-based differences, women and men are 
different in the way they play their leadership role: while men are characterised mainly to agentic
3
  
attributes (Eagly et al., 2003), women are more ascribed to communal characteristics. Communal 
characteristics are concerned primarily with the welfare of other people, helpfulness, kindness, 
sympathy, sensitivity, nurturing and gentleness. According to Nielsen and Huse (2010) such 
elements are translated in working situations into accepting others‟ positions, supporting and 
soothing others and contributing to relational and interpersonal problems. Moreover, research has 
found evidence that female directors are more likely to be cooperative and collaborative and they 
are more oriented towards improving and enhancing the others‟ self-worth (Eagly et al., 2003). 
According to Siciliano (1996), board gender diversity improves organisational performance because 
it provides new insights and perspectives. Bilimoria (2000: 27) suggests that women are valued as 
board members for their ability to „provide strategic input and generate productive discourse‟.  
Such abilities, combined with the communal characteristics predominant in female directors, are 
more likely to lead to the women‟s active involvement in issues of a strategic nature that concern 
the firm and its stakeholders. Thus „women may be particularly sensitive to – and may exercise 
influence on – decisions pertaining to certain organisational practices, such as corporate social 
                                                 
2
 Although diversity is a rich concept and would include gender, race, age, possible disabilities, etc., given the 
operational difficulties in proxying for such multiple diversity, we will rely only on the presence of women on the 
board, i.e. gender diversity. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
3
 Agentic attributes describe a behaviour that is independent, masterful, assertive, and instrumentally competent (Eagly 
et al., 2003). 
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responsibility and environmental politics‟ (Nielsen and Huse, 2010: 138). This leads us to the 
formulation of the third hypothesis, in alternative form: 
H3:  Corporate social performance is positively associated with the proportion of women directors. 
 
Board leadership – CEO duality 
CEO duality occurs when one individual serves as both chairman of the board of directors and chief 
executive officer. Best practice in corporate governance recommends the separation of the role of 
the chairman from that of the CEO (OECD, 2004), in order to ensure a frank and honest discussion 
of the performance of the firm (Carver, 1990). According to Fama and Jensen (1983: 314) CEO 
duality „signals the absence of separation between decision control and decision management‟. 
Forker (1992: 117) adds that „a dominant personality commanding a company may be detrimental 
to the interest of shareholders‟. Roberts et al. (2005) assert that CEO duality constrains board 
independence, as combining the role of CEO and chairman compromises the system of checks and 
balances and represents a conflict of interests, thus reducing the overall accountability of the firm. 
Thus, based on the agency arguments of Forker (1992) and Roberts et al. (2005), CEO duality 
reduces the overall legitimacy of the company in front of stakeholders.  
In contrast to agency theory, organisation theory supports the idea that strong leadership could be 
interpreted as a characteristic that brings legitimacy, as it sends a signal to stakeholders that the firm 
has a clear direction (Salancik and Meindl, 1984) and that „someone is in charge and that the fate of 
the organisation depends on that person‟ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 263). Thus, CEO duality 
could help a firm maintaining its relationships with stakeholders by invoking a sense of managerial 
efficacy because „the consolidation of the two most senior management positions establishes a unity 
of command at the top of the firm, with unambiguous leadership clarifying decision-making 
authority and sending reassuring signals to stakeholders‟ (Finkelstein and D‟Aveni, 1994: 1080). 
Given the two contrasting perspectives, we formulate the CEO duality hypothesis in the null form, 
with two competing alternative hypotheses: 
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H4: Corporate social performance is not associated with CEO duality. 
The alternative hypothesis of a negative association is based on agency theory, while the alternative 
hypothesis of a positive association is based on organisation theory. 
 
Board structure - presence of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee 
Board reputation is not just a function of the composition of the board as a whole, but it also 
depends on the structure and composition of its subcommittees (Xie et al., 2003). According to 
Zahra and Pearce (1989), the firm‟s board structure affects the directors‟ commitment and 
involvement in shaping the goals and strategy of the firm, because it defines the internal 
organisation and division of tasks among the board‟s committees. Furthermore, most important 
board decisions are taken at a committee level (Kesner, 1988).  
A firm actively engaging with stakeholders can undertake various decisions and actions at board 
level in order to manage social responsibility, sustainability or ethical issues. In particular, the 
presence of a corporate social responsibility committee
4
, or of a director in charge of such issues 
indicates an active strategic posture (Ullman, 1985) with regards to stakeholder relationships. 
Such a committee is involved in the stakeholder engagement process and in the way the firm turns 
social strategy into action. The presence of a CSR committee can be interpreted as a signal that the 
firm sends to stakeholders in order to show its commitment and involvement in CSR (Lam and Li, 
2007). Post et al. (2002) assert that a CSR committee is responsible for reviewing policies and 
conduct with respect to the firm‟s principles and commitment to ethical and social responsibility 
issues. Thus the presence of a CSR committee should reveal the firm‟s willingness to improve its 
corporate behaviour to meet stakeholders‟ expectations. Hence, we hypothesise in alternative form: 
H5: Corporate social performance is positively associated with the presence of a CSR committee. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Such a committee may also be called the sustainability committee or ethics committee. 
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Board relational capital – other directorates 
According to resource dependence theory, board relational capital refers to the actual and potential 
resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by each director (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In order to understand whether the board‟s 
relational capital helps in the provision of both advice and counselling, and reputation, we will refer 
to the board‟s directorate ties to external organisations. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state that prestigious organisations represented on the board provide 
assurance to external stakeholders of the value and worth of the firm, as the firm‟s reputation is 
affected not just by who serves on the board, but also to whom the firm is linked (Bazerman and 
Schoorman, 1983). In this vein, directorate ties may help the firm in attracting critical resources, 
improving corporate reputation and thus ensuring improved performance. 
Previous research found that boards having ties with strategically related organisations are able to 
provide better strategic guidelines and thus improve firm performance (Westphal, 1999; Carpenter 
and Westphal, 2001). Moreover, empirical studies show that boards with great prestige experience 
less underpricing during an IPO (Certo et al., 2001; Kassinin and Vafeas, 2002).  
Nevertheless, recent discussion (Di Pietra et al., 2008) suggests that independent directors may not 
properly fulfil their functions if they serve on too many boards, as they cannot adequately comply 
with all their duties. Directors with too many appointments would not be able to provide enough 
and adequate attention not only to monitor and evaluate management‟s behaviour, but also to advice 
and counsel the firm, attract critical resource and increase the firm‟s reputation.  
Given the opposing views on the effects of multiple directorships on board performance, we state 
our last research hypothesis in null form, with two competing alternative hypotheses: 
H6: Corporate social performance is not associated with the board‟s relational capital. 
The alternative hypothesis of a positive association is based on enhanced reputation, while the 






4. Research method 
 
Sample 
The initial sample for this study consists of the 100 companies listed in the Business Ethics 100 
Best Corporate Citizens for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. The rank is built on the KLD overall 
social performance rating obtained as the average of the ratings in seven corporate social 
performance areas: Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, 
Environment, Human Rights, and Product Quality and Safety
5
.  
Given that some companies were listed for more than one year in succession whilst others were 
listed for only one year and that we lost some observations because of lack of data, the total number 
of observations is 278 and the total number of companies is 176
6
. For each company and year, 
archival data about board reputation and CSR performance are collected as follows.  
 
Measures of corporate social performance 
Data on corporate social performance are collected from the KLD‟s SOCRATES database, which is 
a comprehensive research database measuring the social performance of corporations. The web-
based database
7
 contains social and environmental ratings indicators on the Business Ethics 100 
Best Corporate Citizens for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
                                                 
5
 The choice of this sample does not lead to biased results given that we look at the social performance of firms in single 
areas of CSR.  Whilst belonging to the list of the Best Corporate Citizens, these firms present both strengths and 
weaknesses as the ratings present both positive and negative values. Thus KLD‟s social performance data of the Top 
100 Best Corporate Citizens provides a great degree of variability in the behaviour of the firms. Moreover by using a 
period of three years (2005, 2006, and 2007) we are able to analyse the company‟s longer-term social performance. 
Nonetheless, we recognise that the generalisation of the findings of the study may be limited given the fact that the 
sample consisted of the 176 most highly rated companies. 
6
 The panel consists of 93, 96, 89 companies respectively for year 2005, 2006 and 2007. 25 companies appear in the list 





Companies are rated in seven corporate social performance areas: Community, Corporate 
Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product Quality and 
Safety. For each area, KLD analysts assign „strengths‟ and „concerns‟ on a 5-point scale. Each area 
score is then determined by subtracting the concerns scores from the strengths scores. Data are 
collected in a disciplined process from a wide variety of company, government, and non-
government organisations and media sources. Once the information is collected, KLD rates the 
social performance of companies using a proprietary framework of positive and negative indicators. 
KLD data have been extensively used in the management literature on corporate social and 
environmental performance (see, e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Hillman and Keim, 2001; David et al., 2007) as well as recent social and environmental accounting 
research (see, e.g., Cho et al., 2006; Cho and Patten, 2007).  
Given the multi-dimensionality of the concept of corporate social performance, we make use of 
several measures based on KLD‟s data: community performance (comm), employee relations 
performance (er), environmental performance (env), human rights performance (hr) and product 
quality performance (pr) ratings. We exclude, on the grounds of potential endogeneity problems, 
both the KLD ratings regarding the firm‟s governance and diversity.  
Moreover, we employ an overall corporate social performance (csp) rating, determined as the 
average of the ratings obtained in the community, employee relations, environment, human rights 
and product quality areas.  
Governance related variables 
 Data on board composition are collected from the firms‟ annual reports and proxy 
statements. For each company it was possible to find the name and the type of directors (i.e. 
executive or independent non-executive director), a description of their role within the board (i.e. 
membership in a committee) and, in general, a brief biography. The board composition (prind) is 
measured by the proportion of independent directors and the board competence is measured by the 
proportion of community influentials (pci). Community influentials are identified using the brief 
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biographical note that is reported in the proxy statement. Community influentials are classified 
following Hillman et al. (2000): academicians, politicians (including retired politicians), military 
officers (including retired military officers) and members or directors of social/non profit 
organisations (including members of clergy and religious leaders). We measure board diversity as 
the proportion of women sitting on the board (pw).  The presence of CEO duality (dual) is 
measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board and 0 otherwise. The board structure is measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company has identified a director in charge of social responsibility issues or when boards have a 
committee in charge of CSR/ethics/sustainability matters, 0 otherwise (csr_board). We employ 
two measures of relational capital. Following (Koenig and Gogel, 1981) we use the average 
number of directorships held by non-executive directors (ratio_neddir). We also measure relational 
capital by considering the average number of directorships held by community influentials 
(ratio_cidir). 
Figure 1 summarizes the research hypotheses and the measurement of independent variables. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Control variables 
We select control variables on the basis of prior studies on governance and corporate performance. 
First of all, we consider other board variables that may have an impact on corporate social 
performance. Following Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), we control for board size 
(bsize).  
We select accounting performance, size and industry as control variables based on prior studies 
(Ullman, 1985; Johnson and Greening, 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2003; Brammer et al., 2006) investigating the determinants of social performance.  
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Following Ullman (1985), we assume financial performance influences the financial capability to 
undertake costly programs related to social demands. We measure financial performance (roe) as 
the return on equity.  
According to Burke et al. (1986), as firms grow they are more likely to adopt CSR principles 
because of the increased pressures the firms experience from various stakeholders. We measure size 
(size) as the natural logarithm of total sales.  
The nature of a company‟s industry has been identified as a factor potentially driving corporate 
social performance. For example, companies whose economic activities modify the environment, 
such as natural resources companies (mining, forestry, oil and gas, etc.) are clearly more closely 
monitored for environmental performance than companies in other industries (Dierkes and Preston, 
1977) while consumer-oriented companies may exhibit greater concern about demonstrating their 
social involvement to the community, since it is likely to affect the corporate reputation and 
therefore influence sales (Cowen et al., 1987). Companies in the sample belong to nine industries 
(basic industries, cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical consumer goods, cyclical services, non-
cyclical services, financial, general industrial, information technology, utilities), thus we employ 
eight dummies.  
Data analysis 
 We consider panel data techniques to be the most suitable for testing our hypotheses. Given 
that we find cross-section heteroskedasticity, the fixed effects models with cross-section 
heteroskedasticity cannot be efficiently estimated with OLS. Thus, we specify the following panel 





csp  Measure of corporate social performance. It refers to the KLD overall and components 
ratings (csp, comm, er, env, hr, pr)  
prind    board composition; proportion of independent directors 

cspit  1prindit 2pciit 3pwit 4dualit 5csr _boardit 6ratio_ dirit 
7bsizeit 8roeit 9sizeit 10nindustrynit  it
  
18 
pci    board competence; proportion of community influentials 
dual    board leadership; dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also chairman, 0 otherwise 
csr_board  board structure; dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has identified a director in charge 
of social responsibility issues or when boards have a committee in charge of 
CSR/ethics/sustainability matters, 0 otherwise 
ratio_dir  relational capital; we employ two measures: average number of directorships held by non-
executive directors (ratio_neddir) or by community influentials (ratio_cidir) 
pw   board diversity; proportion of female directors 
bsize    board size; number of directors sitting on the board 
roe    profitability; return on equity 
size    company‟s size; natural logarithm of total sales 
industryn  Industry dummies (basic industries, cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical consumer goods, 




5. Empirical results 
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Table 1 shows the social performance ratings of the companies in the sample. The overall social 
performance score (csp) takes into account all strengths and weaknesses of each component 
considered. The mean is 0.771, and the standard deviation is 0.455. On average, companies seem to 
perform better with issues involving community relations (the mean for comm is 1.194, and the 
maximum is almost 5.0) and employee relations (the mean for er is 1.013, and the maximum is 
4.661). Major concerns can be identified in issues regarding human rights (the mean for hr is 0.166, 
and the minimum is -4.289) and product quality and safety (the mean for pr is 0.529, and the 
minimum is -2.921). From the standard deviation data, we can also say that there seems to be great 
variation among companies in the sample about how they deal with the different CSR areas. The 
community and environmental issues present the largest variance. On the other side, human rights 
(hr) and product quality and safety (pr) issues seem to be more uniformly managed by companies in 
the sample. Over the three-years the social performance of companies seems to improve in all areas, 
except for human rights (hr) and product quality and safety (pr), which show a decrease in year 
2006. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables. During the three years period, 
the mean (median) proportion of independent director (prind) is 78.2% (81.8%), the mean (median) 
proportion of community influentials (pci) is equal to 24.4% (22.2%), indicating that almost 1 in 
every 4 directors is a community influential. The minimum of pci is 0 and the maximum is 77.8%. 
Women directors (pw) represent on average 15% of board members (median is equal to 14.8%). 
Only in one case is the board made up of a majority of women directors (Student Loan Corporation 
in 2006). CEO duality (dual) is quite a common practice given that during the three years on 
average 65.8% of companies have the CEO who is also the chairman of the board of directors. In 
56.7% of cases, the companies have a CSR or ethics committee (csr_board), it being more common 
in 2006 (80% of companies) rather than in 2005 (37.6%) or in 2007 (51.7%). On average, non-
executives have 3.081 directorships in other companies (median value for ratio_neddir is 2.778), 
while community influentials seem to be slightly busier with a mean of 3.675 directorships (median 
value for ratio_cidir is 3.5).  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Descriptive statistics for the control variables are reported in Table 3. On average, boards are made 
up of 10 members (bsize), the median value is 11 and the maximum value is 28. Companies in the 
sample present on average a roe equal to almost 20% and size is, on average, about $11,700,000 net 
sales. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 shows the Pearson‟s correlation matrix. The overall social performance score (csp) is 
significantly and positively correlated to the proportion of community influentials (pci), the 
proportion of women (pw), the presence of a CSR committee (csr_board), the number of 
directorships of the independent directors (ratio_neddir) and it is negatively correlated to CEO 




INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The correlation analysis also shows significant pairwise correlations among the independent 
variables. In order to test whether relevant multi-collinearity can affect the results, we performed 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. The largest value among all the independent variables is 
often used as an indicator of the severity of multi-collinearity (Neter et al., 1996). A maximum VIF 
value in excess of 10 is frequently taken as an indication that multi-collinearity may be unduly 
influencing the least squares estimate. In our case, the largest VIF is equal to 2.29, so multi-
collinearity among the predictor variables is not a problem. 
Multivariate results 
Table 5 provides the results for the multivariate regression model. Models 1 to 6 depict the 
relationships between our variables of interest and the six measures of corporate social performance 
employed in the study, respectively: the overall social performance (csp), and its constituent 
components: community performance (comm), employee relations (er), environmental performance 
(env), human rights (hr) and product quality and safety (pr)
8
. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Model 1 investigates the relationships between the overall social performance (csp) and the 
variables of interest. The R
2
 is 0.198 and the model appears highly significant (chi square = 55.79, p 
= 0.000).  As regards our variables of interest, the proportion of independent directors (prind) (H1), 
community influentials (pci) (H2) and women directors (pw) (H3) are significantly associated with 
the overall social performance (csp) with the expected sign. The proportion of independent directors 
(prind) (H1) and the proportion of community influentials (pci) (H2) on the board of directors are 
both positively related to the overall social performance (csp), suggesting that the presence of 
independent directors and community influentials both enhance board awareness about 
                                                 
8
 In the discussion below, we have referred to these as Models 1-6 although we recognise that community performance 
(comm), employee relations (er), environmental performance (env), human rights (hr) and product quality and safety 
(pr) are essentially each a sub-set of the overall social performance (csp). 
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stakeholders‟ expectations and promote corporate social performance in order to ensure congruence 
between the firm‟s decisions and stakeholders‟ values. The proportion of women directors (pw) 
(H3) is also positively associated with the overall social performance (csp) suggesting that the 
presence of women on the board increases the awareness of the company on issues relating to 
various stakeholders and thus leads to greater social performance. CEO duality (dual) (H4) is also 
significantly associated with the overall social performance (csp) and the sign of the relationship is 
negative, providing empirical support for the alternative hypothesis of a negative association as 
predicted by agency theory. Thus, the empirical analysis supports the advocates of the separation of 
the roles of CEO and chairman and the agency theory hypothesis that CEO duality reduces the 
overall legitimacy of the company for its stakeholders. Model 1 provides mixed empirical support 
of a relationship between the board‟s relational capital proxies (ratio_neddir, ratio_cidir) (H6) and 
the overall corporate social performance: while the average number of directorships held by non-
executive directors (ratio_neddir) is positively associated with the overall social performance (csp), 
the average number of directorships held by community influentials (ratio_cidir) is negatively 
associated with it. Such evidence is in line with the idea that boards with great prestige in terms of 
the external directorships of non-executive directors benefit in terms of stakeholders‟ legitimacy 
(Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002) but, when non-executive directors are community influentials, the fact 
that they serve on many boards is detrimental to the legitimacy of the company as they cannot 
adequately play their service function, in line with the results of Di Pietra et al. (2008). 
Model 2 provides empirical evidence of the relationship between community performance (comm) 
and board reputation. Model 2 is the model with greatest predictive power: the R
2
 is 0.308 and the 
model appears highly significant (chi square = 142.18, p = 0.000).  Among the proxies for board 
reputation, we find a significant association between community performance (comm) and the 
proportion of community influentials (pci) (H2), the proportion of women directors (pw) (H3) and 
the presence of a CSR committee (csr_board) (H5). The findings thus suggest that community 
influentials are able to focus the attention of the board on the impact of the company‟s activity on 
  
22 
the community. Female directors‟ communal characteristics (i.e. friendly, kind, unselfish, 
concerned with others, and expressive, Eagly et al., 2003) increase the sensitivity of the board 
towards external stakeholders‟ needs. The CSR committee, which is in charge of activities and 
strategies relating to ethical, environmental and social issues, is more likely to increase the 
legitimacy of the company in the community. 
In Model 3, as regards our variables of interest, only the proportion of women directors (pw) (H3) 
and CEO duality (dual) (H4) appear to be related to the corporate social performance measured as 
relations with the employees (er). The estimated coefficients are significant and they have the 
expected sign. The coefficient for the proportion of women directors (pw) (H3) is positive, thus 
supporting the hypothesis of a positive association between the proportion of women directors and 
corporate social performance. Such a result could be interpreted along the lines that boards with a 
greater proportion of women directors are more sensitive to others‟ needs and self-worth. The 
coefficient for CEO duality (dual) (H4) is negative, supporting the alternative hypothesis 
formulated by agency theory that CEO duality reduces the ability of the company to pursue and 
implement socially responsible strategies, rather than the organisation theory hypothesis that strong 
leadership is a characteristic that brings legitimacy. 
Model 4 provides the regression coefficients when corporate social performance is measured along 
the environmental dimension (env). The proportion of independent directors (prind) (H1) and the 
proportion of community influentials (pci) (H2) are both significantly and positively associated with 
environmental performance (env). This evidence supports the idea that independent directors (H1) 
and community influentials (H2) are more likely to consider stakeholders‟ needs and expectations 
in particular regarding the environmental impacts of corporate activities. 
Model 5 provides evidence of a relationship between the proportion of women directors (pw) (H3), 
the presence of the CSR committee (csr_board) (H5) and corporate social performance, measured 
along the human rights dimension (hr). The empirical evidence suggests that a sensitive and pro-
active board on stakeholders‟ needs and issues is associated with greater strengths in human rights. 
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We find mixed evidence of the relationship between the relational capital of the board 
(ratio_neddir, ratio_cidir) (H6) and corporate social performance, measured along the human rights 
dimension (hr). The external directorships of non-executives (ratio_neddir) are positively related to 
human rights performance (hr), supporting the idea that they bring greater prestige and awareness 
of sensitive issues. When the board relational capital is measured as the average number of 
directorships of community influentials (ratio_cidir), we find a negative sign for this relationship, 
thus suggesting that while community influentials are likely per se to improve social performance, 
they are detrimental to it if they have many directorships. The evidence confirms that community 
influentials are not able to properly fulfil their functions if they serve on too many boards and thus 
are not able to increase the firm‟s social performance. 
Model 6 provides quite surprising results, given that it shows a significant and negative relationship 
between the proportion of community influentials (pci) (H2) and corporate social performance 
measured along the product quality and safety dimension (pr). A possible explanation of this 
negative relationship is that a community influential director may not have adequate competences to 
improve product quality and safety and thus concentrates the efforts of the company in other areas 
of social performance such as community or the environment.   




In order to test the robustness of our results, we ran a number of alternative models.  In particular 
we ran the regressions using both the fixed effects model and the first difference model. In both 
cases, the results do not vary significantly from those reported in the previous section and hence the 
detailed results are not reported here. The only relevant change in results under these two models is 
obtained with respect to the proportion of independent directors (prind) (H1) which is not 
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significantly associated with corporate social performance measured as the overall average score 
(csp) and along the environmental dimension (env). 
We have also taken into consideration that our results may suffer from an endogeneity 
problem due to the potential endogenous relationship between community influentials and 
social performance. Thus, we perform a three-stage least square regression model using two 
simultaneous equations. Particularly, equation (2) shows the effect of community 
influentials over the overall performance score while equation (3) tests the effect of social 






csp  Measure of corporate social performance. It refers to the KLD overall and social components 
ratings (csp, comm, er, env, hr, pr)  
prind    board composition; proportion of independent directors 
pci    board competence; proportion of community influentials 
dual    board leadership; dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also chairman, 0 otherwise 
csr_board  board structure; dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has identified a director in charge 
of social responsibility issues or when boards have a committee in charge of 
CSR/ethics/sustainability matters, 0 otherwise 
ratio_dir  relational capital; we employ two measures: average number of directorships held by non-
executive directors (ratio_neddir) or by community influentials (ratio_cidir) 
pw   board diversity; proportion of female directors 
bsize    board size; number of directors sitting on the board 
roe    profitability; return on equity 
size    company‟s size; natural logarithm of total sales 
yr2005 Year dummy variable equal to 1 if data point is observed in year 2005, 0 otherwise 
yr2006 Year dummy variable equal to 1 if data point is observed in year 2006, 0 otherwise 
industryn  Industry dummies (basic industries, cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical consumer goods, 
cyclical services, financial, general industrial, information technology, utilities)  
 
The results are presented in Table 6. Columns (A) and (B) report results respectively for equations 
(2) and (3). The results indicate that the proportion of community influentials (pci) is positive and 
significant for corporate social performance (csp)  (p = 0.051) (column A), while the coefficient of 
corporate social performance (csp) is not significant (p = 0.131) for the proportion of community 

cspit  0 1prindi 2pcii 3pwi 4duali 5csr _boardi 6ratio_ diri 
7bsizei 8yr2005i 9yr2006i 10nindustryni  i

pciit  0 1cspi 2prindi 3pwi 4duali 5csr _boardi 6ratio_ diri 
7bsizei 8roe 9size 10yr2005i 11yr2006i 12nindustryni  i
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influentials (pci) (column B), thus confirming that community influentials play a role in orienting 
corporate social performance.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between board reputation, in terms of composition, 
competence, diversity, leadership, structure and links with the external environment, and the social 
performance of Best Corporate Citizens, after controlling for other company-specific 
characteristics. By doing so, we extend previous studies on social performance, by considering 
board reputation as a governance contextual factor that can influence the ability of the company to 
be involved in socially responsible actions. 
Our results show that board reputation plays a role in driving corporate social performance in the 
companies that are the Best Corporate Citizens.  
Our first hypothesis on the association between the proportion of independent directors and 
corporate social performance (H1) is supported by our statistical tests for the overall social 
performance and for the component of social performance measured along the environmental 
dimension. 
The empirical analysis also provides support for the second hypothesis regarding the role of 
community influential directors, who have been identified as promoters of stakeholders‟ 
engagement and management. We find a significant and positive association between the proportion 
of community influentials and our measure of overall corporate social performance (H2). Such 
positive association also holds for two components of corporate social performance: community 
performance and environmental performance.  
Together the evidence suggests that the traditional dichotomy between insiders and outsiders may 
not depict well the service role of the board in terms of legitimacy and reputation. Research that 
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relates corporate governance and social performance should thus more specifically consider the 
various individual characteristics of directors that may have an impact on various corporate 
processes carried out by the board of directors.  
Regarding our third hypothesis on the role of women on the board, we find a significant and 
positive relationship between the proportion of women on the board and the overall social 
performance (H3), community performance, employee relations and human rights. Such evidence 
suggests that women directors enhance sensitivity towards others and their consideration of the 
multiple interests of stakeholders is able to improve the service role of the board of directors and 
thus lead to greater legitimacy and social performance. 
We provide empirical evidence that best standards of corporate governance also matter in terms of 
how the company performs socially. Our empirical evidence supports the alternative hypothesis 
formulated on the basis of agency theory of a negative relationship between CEO duality and 
corporate social performance (H4), suggesting that when the roles of CEO and Chairman of the 
board are concentrated in the hands of the same person, the company is less likely to be involved in 
socially responsible activities, or at least, it is likely to be associated with lower corporate social 
performance.  
The empirical results also support our fifth hypothesis, providing evidence of a significant and 
positive relationship between the presence of a CSR committee and corporate social performance 
(H5) measured along the community dimension. When the board appoints a committee to manage 
and work on the social and environmental impacts of business activities, it is more likely that the 
company will have a greater legitimacy in the community in which it operates. 
Regarding the results on the relationship between a board‟s relational capital and corporate social 
performance (H6), the empirical evidence supports the alternative hypothesis of a positive 
association (enhances reputation) when a board‟s relational capital is measured by the number of 
directorships of non-executive directors. This can be interpreted along the lines that when 
independent directors have a greater number of ties with other organisations, then they are able to 
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provide better strategic guidelines on how to manage the social impacts of corporate activities. On 
the other hand, the empirical evidence also supports the alternative hypothesis of a negative 
association (perceived inadequacy of commitment) when a board‟s relational capital is measured by 
the number of directorships of community influentials. The empirical results suggest that, although 
community influential directors are likely to be associated with higher levels of social performance, 
when they hold too many directorships, their contribution to the overall success of CSR is negative. 
The evidence thus supports the view that community influential directors with too many 
directorships are not able to successfully contribute to corporate social performance. 
Summing up, we are of the view that companies which have CSR more “at their heart” seem to 
benefit from this approach: indeed, taken overall, the appointment of community influential and 
women directors to the board and the presence of a CSR Committee have a positive impact on 
corporate social performance. On the other hand, where companies exhibit corporate governance 
that does not meet generally accepted best standards (for example, they combine the roles of 
Chairman and CEO) there is a negative effect on social performance. 
Our paper provides both theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical perspective, in 
times of great debate about the role of the board of directors in driving corporate performance in an 
ethical and responsible way, it shows that research on corporate governance needs to move beyond 
the paradigms of agency theory to overcome the traditional distinction between executive and non- 
executive directors, because of the non-homogeneity in terms of backgrounds, competencies and 
effects on how the board performs its various roles.  From a practical perspective, the findings 
provide useful insights to governance standard setters, regulators and investors interested in the 
triple bottom line performance of companies, and the important role of the board of directors in 
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Figure 1. Research hypotheses 
 
Variable of interest   Proxy Measure Expected sign Variable 
Board composition H1 Role of independent 
Proportion of independent 
directors 
+ prind 
Board competence H2 
Role of community 
influential 
Proportion of community 
influentials 
+ pci 
Board diversity H3 
Role of female 
directors 
Proportion of women 
directors 
+ pw 
Board leadership H4 CEO Duality 
Dummy = 1 if CEO is also 
chairman 
+/- dual 
Board structure H5 
CSR committee or 
director in charge of 
CSR issues 
Dummy = 1 if there is a 
CSR committee or a 






Links with the 
external environment 
N. of directorships of NED 
/ n. of NED 
+/- ratio_neddir 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables 
  
   mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
3-yrs csp 0.771 0.455 -0.488 0.479 0.711 1.030 2.366 
(n=278)  comm 1.194 1.441 -1.798 0.036 1.015 2.065 4.993 
  er 1.013 1.122 -1.462 0.161 1.030 1.804 4.661 
  env 0.964 1.142 -1.219 0.157 0.543 1.535 4.748 
  hr 0.155 0.823 -4.289 0.339 0.409 0.433 3.128 
  pr 0.529 0.799 -2.921 0.444 0.537 0.981 2.773 
                  
2005 csp 0.618 0.174 0.434 0.482 0.581 0.689 1.126 
(n=93)  comm 0.981 1.640 -1.798 -0.240 -0.240 1.318 4.993 
  er 0.781 1.175 -0.974 0.135 1.243 1.243 3.460 
  env 0.565 0.995 -1.198 0.157 0.157 0.157 4.223 
  hr 0.190 0.755 -2.450 0.339 0.339 0.339 3.128 
  pr 0.567 0.715 -1.885 0.444 0.444 0.444 2.773 
                  
2006 csp 0.753 0.264 0.472 0.543 0.698 0.818 1.775 
(n=96)  comm 1.400 1.347 -0.950 0.558 1.060 2.567 4.080 
  er 1.107 1.026 -1.141 0.161 1.030 1.898 4.069 
  env 1.028 1.079 -1.219 0.158 0.617 1.535 4.748 
  hr 0.089 0.968 -4.289 0.433 0.433 0.433 2.794 
  pr 0.468 0.766 -1.240 0.093 0.537 0.981 2.314 
                  
2007 csp 0.785 0.303 0.490 0.583 0.659 0.856 2.148 
(n=89)  comm 1.193 1.291 -0.944 0.525 1.015 1.994 4.443 
  er 1.154 1.139 -1.462 0.579 0.987 1.804 4.661 
  env 1.312 1.231 -0.302 0.120 0.965 2.233 4.346 
  hr 0.191 0.720 -2.014 0.409 0.409 0.409 1.621 
  pr 0.556 0.914 -2.921 0.124 0.559 0.994 2.299 
csp: overall social performance  
comm: community performance 
er: employee relations performance 
env: environmental performance 
hr: human rights performance  





Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
 
   mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
                  
3-yrs prind 0.782 0.115 0.227 0.727 0.818 0.857 0.938 
 (n=278) pci 0.244 0.184 0.000 0.100 0.222 0.364 0.778 
 pw 0.155 0.105 0.000 0.091 0.154 0.200 0.625 
  dual 0.658 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  csr_board 0.567 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  ratio_neddir 3.081 1.405 0.556 2.000 2.778 3.909 9.357 
  ratio_cidir 3.675 2.016 0.000 2.000 3.500 5.000 12.000 
                  
2005 prind 0.787 0.103 0.500 0.727 0.818 0.875 0.929 
(n=93)  pci 0.264 0.195 0.000 0.111 0.250 0.364 0.667 
 pw 0.141 0.116 0.000 0.077 0.125 0.182 0.500 
  dual 0.602 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  csr_board 0.376 0.487 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  ratio_neddir 2.323 1.062 0.833 1.571 2.111 2.700 6.143 
  ratio_cidir 3.025 1.838 0.000 1.708 2.750 4.000 9.500 
                  
2006 prind 0.776 0.111 0.364 0.714 0.800 0.852 0.938 
(n=96)  pci 0.213 0.169 0.000 0.077 0.200 0.345 0.571 
 pw 0.172 0.098 0.000 0.111 0.154 0.207 0.625 
  dual 0.708 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  csr_board 0.800 0.402 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  ratio_neddir 3.868 1.337 1.444 2.826 3.739 4.571 9.357 
  ratio_cidir 4.537 2.082 1.000 3.000 4.400 5.500 12.000 
                  
2007 prind 0.785 0.130 0.227 0.750 0.818 0.857 0.923 
(n=89)  pci 0.257 0.185 0.000 0.111 0.200 0.400 0.778 
 pw 0.149 0.099 0.000 0.091 0.154 0.200 0.400 
  dual 0.663 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  csr_board 0.517 0.503 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  ratio_neddir 3.024 1.350 0.556 2.000 2.778 3.833 7.091 
  ratio_cidir 3.514 1.852 0.000 2.000 3.450 5.000 8.286 
prind: proportion of independent directors 
pci: proportion of community influential directors 
pw: proportion of women directors 
dual: dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also chairman, 0 otherwise 
csr_board: dummy variable equal to 1 if company has a social responsibility committee, 0 otherwise 
ratio_neddir: average number of directorships of non-executive directors 








Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the control variables 
 
    mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
                  
3-yrs         
  bsize 10.572 2.670 5.000 9.000 11.000 12.000 28.000 
  roe 19.960 22.745 -77.010 11.340 19.650 26.000 178.910 
  size 11700.00 18700.00 51.566 1294.99 4787.65 13300.00 147000.00 
                  
2005         
  bsize 10.161 2.508 5.000 8.000 10.000 12.000 18.000 
  roe 20.851 25.505 -32.380 9.845 17.410 23.975 178.910 
  Size 8023.20 14000.00 60.26 886.40 2133.10 9441.00 86700.00 
                  
2006         
  bsize 10.969 2.634 6.000 9.000 11.000 13.000 20.000 
  roe 19.285 15.139 -32.750 12.730 17.170 24.760 85.570 
  size 14100.00 23200.00 51.57 1642.17 5272.00 14300.00 147000.00 
                  
2007         
  bsize 10.573 2.832 6.000 9.000 11.000 12.000 28.000 
  roe 19.775 25.745 -77.010 11.340 19.650 29.620 92.470 
  size 13000.00 17100.00 113.57 1913.40 6591.77 15800.00 98800.000 
bsize: n. of directors sitting on board 
roe: return on equity 




















* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
csp: overall social performance  
comm: community performance 
er: employee relations performance 
env: environmental performance 
hr: human rights performance  
pr: product quality and safety performance 
prind: proportion of independent directors 










pw: proportion of women on board 
dual: dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also chairman, 0 otherwise 
csr_board: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has identified a director in 
charge of social responsibility issues or when boards have a committee 
in charge of CSR/ethics/sustainability matters, 0 otherwise 
ratio_neddir: average number of directorships of non-executive directors 
ratio_cidir: average number of directorships of community influentials 
bsize: number of directors sitting on board 
size: natural logarithm of total sales 





Table 5. Multivariate regression results (equation 1)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES csp comm er env hr pr 
        
prind 0.503** 0.753 0.566 1.158** 0.071 -0.034 
  [0.040] [0.338] [0.371] [0.032] [0.857] [0.939] 
pci 0.367* 1.891*** -0.071 0.954** -0.311 -0.625** 
  [0.062] [0.002] [0.870] [0.023] [0.368] [0.042] 
pw 0.411* 1.425* 0.144* -0.149 0.581** 0.051 
  [0.089] [0.090] [0.085] [0.811] [0.021] [0.898] 
dual -0.123** -0.174 -0.212* -0.198 -0.007 -0.022 
  [0.035] [0.330] [0.080] [0.174] [0.950] [0.819] 
csr_board 0.042 0.400** 0.017 0.200 0.266** -0.141 
  [0.474] [0.022] [0.914] [0.177] [0.020] [0.194] 
ratio_neddir 0.053* 0.092 0.027 0.039 0.116*** -0.012 
  [0.061] [0.325] [0.698] [0.580] [0.009] [0.813] 
ratio_cidir -0.046*** -0.156*** -0.005 0.003 -0.077** 0.004 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.910] [0.945] [0.013] [0.891] 
bsize 0.018 -0.013 0.036 -0.001 0.053*** 0.017 
  [0.134] [0.733] [0.290] [0.966] [0.006] [0.442] 
roe -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 
  [0.175] [0.567] [0.359] [0.209] [0.604] [0.279] 
size 0.055** 0.243*** 0.076 0.070 -0.043 -0.072* 
  [0.011] [0.000] [0.148] [0.140] [0.295] [0.060] 
basic industries 0.045 -1.072** -0.210 0.589 -0.254 1.173*** 
  [0.789] [0.044] [0.636] [0.249] [0.124] [0.000] 
cyclical consumer goods 0.037 -0.881*** -0.161 1.325*** -0.261 0.165 
  [0.649] [0.001] [0.433] [0.000] [0.126] [0.254] 
non-cyclical consumer goods 0.060 -0.882** 0.390 0.820*** 0.162 -0.189 
  [0.617] [0.011] [0.180] [0.002] [0.183] [0.390] 
cyclical services -0.175** -1.309*** -0.036 0.424*** -0.054 0.097 
  [0.023] [0.000] [0.877] [0.008] [0.719] [0.588] 
financial -0.196** -1.962*** 0.023 0.466* 0.071 0.421*** 
  [0.032] [0.000] [0.955] [0.052] [0.607] [0.004] 
general industrial -0.022 -1.165*** 0.189 0.729*** 0.449** 0.585*** 
 [0.789] [0.000] [0.392] [0.001] [0.020] [0.001] 
information technology 0.037 -0.963*** 0.431* 0.824*** -0.541*** 0.434*** 
  [0.672] [0.000] [0.056] [0.000] [0.001] [0.008] 
Utilities -0.206 -1.488*** -1.358*** 1.871*** -0.041 -0.011 
  [0.334] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.845] [0.955] 
Constant -0.721** -2.639*** -0.942 -1.929*** 0.451 1.453** 
  [0.028] [0.005] [0.213] [0.005] [0.396] [0.011] 
              
Observations 265 265 265 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.198 0.308 0.106 0.219 0.139 0.187 
Number of observations 169 169 169 169 169 169 










csp: overall social performance  
comm: community performance 
er: employee relations performance 
env: environmental performance 
hr: human rights performance  
pr: product quality and safety performance 
prind: proportion of independent directors 
pci: proportion of community influential directors 
dual: dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also chairman, 0 otherwise 
csr_board: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has identified a director in charge of social responsibility issues 
or when boards have a committee in charge of CSR/ethics/sustainability matters, 0 otherwise 
ratio_neddir: average number of directorships of non-executive directors 
ratio_cidir: average number of directorships of community influentials 
pw: proportion of women on board 
bsize: n. of directors sitting on board 
roe: return on equity 
size: natural logarithm of total sales 
Industry dummies (basic industries, cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical consumer goods, cyclical services, financial, 
general industrial, information technology, utilities) 
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Table 6. Robustness test - simultaneous equations model  
 
  A B 
VARIABLES csp pci 
      
pci 0.328*   
  [0.051]   
csp   0.354 
    [0.131] 
prind 0.044* 0.184* 
  [0.067] [0.071] 
pw 0.226* 0.097 
  [0.094] [0.382] 
dual -0.116***   
  [0.004]   
csr_board -0.049   
  [0.279]   
ratio_neddir 0.044   
  [0.159]   
ratio_cidir -0.018**   
  [0.043]   
bsize 0.012 0.000 
  [0.814] [0.961] 
roe   0.000 
    [0.658] 
size   0.027*** 
    [0.002] 
yr 2005 -0.152*** 0.077** 
  [0.000] [0.036] 
yr 2006 -0.029 -0.049* 
  [0.636] [0.057] 
basic industries -0.14 -0.061 
  [0.441] [0.616] 
cyclical consumer goods -0.077 0.042 
  [0.615] [0.679] 
non-cyclical consumer goods -0.061 0.175* 
  [0.742] [0.091] 
cyclical services -0.155 0.11 
  [0.333] [0.294] 
financial -0.282 0.23** 
  [0.117] [0.044] 
general industrial -0.115 0.042 
  [0.455] [0.690] 
information technology -0.017 -0.008 
  [0.911] [0.936] 
utilities 0.178 -0.127 
  [ 0.256] [0.219] 
constant 0.691*** -0.648*** 
  [0.002] [0.000] 
      
Observations 265 265 
R-squared 0.1751 0.1885 
p-values in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
